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fUnDAmEnTAL RigHTs in THE EU’s ExTERnAL TRADE 
RELATions: fRom pRomoTion ‘through’ TRADE 
AgREEmEnTs To pRoTECTion ‘in’ TRADE AgREEmEnTs
Isabella Mancini*
 INTRODUCTION 
At an international level, the linkage of international trade law and human rights 
law has always been an extremely contested one,1 and ‘one of the central is-
sues confronting international lawyers at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.’2 In the context of a trade regime that has long been accused of being 
embedded in, not least designed by, neoliberal thought, and whose legitimacy 
is highly disputed, questions have been raised as to the normative foundations 
and purpose of such a system today.3 At present, the two legal frameworks 
remain largely separate and hardly speak to each other.4 The main develop-
ments have instead occurred in the context of regional and preferential trade 
agreements.5 In this case, the linkage with human rights has mainly manifested 
in the inclusion of provisions on labour standards, which yet have only recently 
* Isabella Mancini is a PhD candidate at the City Law School (City, University of London) and 
an Early Stage Researcher within the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Network on 
EU Trade and Investment Policy (EUTIP). Isabella is working on a thesis on “The Place of Fun-
damental Rights in the New Generation of EU ‘Deep’ Trade Agreements with other Developed 
Economies”.
1 See inter alia E. U. Petersmann, ‘Human rights and international economic law in the 21st 
century. The need to clarify their interrelationships’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic 
law 3, 3-39; T. Cottier et al. (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (New york: Oxford 
University Press 2005).
2 P. Alston, ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to 
Petersmann’ 13 European Journal of International law 2002, at 181.
3 A. Lang, World Trade law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic order 
(New york: Oxford University Press 2014); q. Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the 
Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2018); P. O’Connell, ‘Brave New 
World? Human Rights in the Era of Globalisation’ in M. A. Baderin and M. Ssenyonjo (eds.), In-
ternational Human Rights law: Six Decades after the uDHR and Beyond (Abingdon: Routledge 
2010); N. Lamp, ‘How Should We Think about the Winners and Losers from Globalization? 
Three Narratives and their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agreements’ 
(queen’s University Legal Research Paper No 2018-102, 2018); F. J. Garcia and T. Meyer, ‘Re-
storing Trade’s Social Contract’ 116 Michigan law Review online 2017, 78-100; F. Bourguignon 
et al., The Globalization of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015); B. Milanovic, 
Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 2005).
4 H. Gott, ‘Labour Standards in International Economic Law: An Introduction’ in H. Gott (ed.), 
labour Standards in International Economic law (Cham: Springer International Publishing 2018), 
at 4.
5 H. Gott, supra note 4, at 3. 
62
CLEER PAPERS 2020/1 Mancini
gained wider acceptance as forming part of an international system of human 
rights.6 
When it comes to trade and human rights linkages, the European Union (EU) 
emerges as a leading actor. Depending on the partner at stake, the EU has 
operationalised the linkage between trade and human rights in different ways: 
by means of human rights conditionality clauses, by making market access 
concessions dependent on, e.g., ratification of a number of human rights instru-
ments and/or ILO Conventions, and most recently via provisions binding the 
Parties to respect certain core labour standards.7 The aim of this paper is none-
theless not to review the history of the EU’s approach to human rights in trade. 
Rather, it focuses on the latest, so-called ‘new generation’ of EU free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with other developed economies, and provides a critique of 
the EU’s understanding and approach to fundamental rights therein. 
The focus is on developed, as opposed to developing or least developed 
countries, for they reflect the main EU’s trade partners of the Post-Lisbon era, 
but most importantly as a way to enable an alternative to the traditional under-
standing of the linkage of trade and fundamental rights. EU trade agreements 
have been used as tools to promote human rights in third countries,8 mainly as 
part of overarching development objectives for developing or least developed 
countries.9 In the past, human rights requirements were a sort of EU political 
messianism or ‘offensive’ interest.10 Conversely, it has been argued that today 
fundamental rights emerge as a ‘defensive’ tool for the EU and the rights of its 
citizens, as a result of deep trade relations with other developed countries.11 
The selection of developed economies as trade partners thus enables fresh 
thinking about fundamental rights in trade, beyond a development issue or as 
a problem for the trade partner alone.12
 6 See v. Mantovalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ 3 European labour law Journal 
2012, 151-172. 
 7 See Section 2.1. below for specific variations of this: whether ratification of fundamental 
ILO Conventions, whether provisions committing the Parties not to lower levels of protection and 
so on.
 8 See F. Martines, ‘Human Rights Clauses in EU agreements’ in S. Poli (ed.), Protecting Hu-
man Rights in the European union’s External Relations (CLEER PAPERS 2016/5) (The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Institute 2015).
 9 L. Bartels, ‘The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union’ in M. Cremona 
(ed.), Developments in Eu External Relations law (New york: Oxford University Press 2008).
10 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘In the face of crisis: Input legitimacy, output legitimacy and the political Mes-
sianism of European integration’ 34 Journal of European Integration 2012, 825-841.
11 v. Depaigne, ‘Protecting fundamental rights in trade agreements between the EU and third 
countries’ 42 European law Review 2017, at 563.
12 The paper will speak of ‘fundamental rights’ as opposed to ‘human rights’ for two main 
reasons: the willingness to take an EU law and governance perspective, which in turn should 
allow going beyond the minimum floor and understanding provided by internationally recognised 
human rights. By referring to fundamental rights, the aim is to appreciate a broader set of rights 
which additionally form part of and are recognised under EU law. The paper thus wants to out-
distance understandings of human rights according to which protection of rights would be satis-
fied with the protection of basic rights or would be limited to civil and political rights. There is an 
important revived debate in the literature on international human rights, particularly on what they 
encompass and their role within the global economy. The most recent contribution in this respect 
is Samuel Moyn’s controversial book ‘Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World.’ Samuel 
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From this perspective, the paper does not embark upon an examination of 
all possible fundamental rights. The focus is on two sets of rights: labour and 
data privacy rights. The former represents the most common set of rights being 
incorporated into trade agreements, while the latter have typically not been 
included in trade agreements and have only recently emerged as an increas-
ingly significant set of rights in the context of digital trade. Regarding labour 
rights, the paper wants to embrace a broad understanding beyond core labour 
standards, which is warranted in a context of ever evolving employment condi-
tions in the digital era, even witnessing labour and data privacy issues coming 
together.13 Labour rights are understood as forming part of broader frames of 
social justice, encompassing i.a. matters of health and safety at the workplace, 
decent work, social protection and promotion of social dialogue. In this respect, 
together with the EU Social Charter, the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for 
a Fair Globalization14 and the objectives of the ILO Decent Work Agenda, rep-
resent key frameworks of reference. By employing the terminology of ‘data 
privacy rights’ the aim is to avoid discussions that dispute the difference between 
‘data protection’ and ‘privacy’ rights, and to focus instead on the protection of 
‘personal’ data, as opposed to any other kind of data.15 The relevance of labour 
and data privacy rights is provided later. Suffice to say that the contrasting way 
they are addressed in EU trade agreements is telling of many inconsistencies 
and deficiencies in the EU’s approach towards the linkage of fundamental rights 
and trade. 
The paper proceeds as follows: it starts with a discussion of how the Treaty 
of Lisbon provides for ‘new normative impetus’ which outdoes the limited per-
ception of trade agreements promoting human rights as a development issue16 
(Section 1). In the light of this, it gives an overview of the EU’s current approach 
to fundamental rights in the new generation trade agreements (Section 2) and 
offers reasons why it is problematic from a fundamental rights perspective (Sec-
Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an unequal World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
2018). The paper is informed by a broad reading of the sources of fundamental rights under EU 
law and international human rights agreements, not least the ILO Conventions. From an EU 
law perspective, fundamental rights are understood as encompassing the rights flowing from the 
sources specified in Article 6 TEU, as well as from the member states’ obligations under interna-
tional human rights treaties to which they are party. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR) has introduced some socio-economic rights which were not included in the ECHR. The 
EUCFR constitutes an important yardstick as it incorporates internationally recognised human 
rights while also developing them further and amplifying their catalogue. As such, it goes beyond 
both minimum standards and understandings of rights limited to civil and political.
13 See F. Hendrickx, ‘video surveillance at work: European Human Rights Court approves 
hidden cameras’, Regulating for Globalization: Trade, labour and Eu law perspectives (18 Oc-
tober 2019), available at <http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2019/10/18/video-surveillance-at-
work-european-human-rights-court-approves-hidden-cameras/>.
14 International Labour Organisation, Ilo Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globaliza-
tion (2008), available at <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/docu-
ments/genericdocument/wcms_371208.pdf>.
15 Recognised under Art.8 of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] 
OJ C326/391.
16 v. Kube, ‘The European Union’s external human rights commitment: what is the legal value 
of Article 21 TEU?’ EuI Working Paper lAW 2016/10 (2010).
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tion 3). It concludes by suggesting a change in perspective and an exploration 
of fundamental ‘in’ trade as opposed to ‘through’ trade (Section 4).
1. THE NEW NORMATIvE IMPETUS OF THE TREATy OF LISBON 
FOR THE EU’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) has been 
brought under the umbrella of the EU’s external action, including its principles 
and objectives. As per Article 207(1) TFEU, the CCP of the Union ‘shall be 
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action.’ Such principles and objectives are to be found in Articles 21 and 3(5) 
TEU, which include human rights and the Union’s values, more broadly. Because 
of Article 207(1), these principles and objectives can now be read as applying 
to the EU CCP, leading some to speak of a ‘Union’s human rights obligation in 
its external relations.’17 Such an alleged obligation has been extensively de-
bated in its scope and effect, raising questions of whether it should be understood 
as giving rise to a duty for the EU to protect the rights of third country citizens.18 
This paper does not embark upon this discussion, its aim being much narrower 
in scope: it wants to rely on the innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon in this regard 
to suggest a change in perspective on the relationship between EU external 
trade and fundamental rights, and address the question of what the combined 
reading of these articles would imply: is it about respecting, protecting and/or 
promoting fundamental rights?
The relevance of this question lies in recent arguments maintaining that the 
Treaty of Lisbon provides a ‘new normative impetus’ that allows going beyond 
the typical understanding that sees human rights in trade agreements as a 
development issue in third countries.19 The EU has traditionally found in pref-
erential trade agreements, and a series of mechanisms attached to them, use-
ful convectors to promote the respect of human rights externally, in the rest of 
the world.20 Meunier and Nicolaïdis have coined the concept of governing 
‘through trade’ to refer to how the EU uses its trade policy ‘to ‘export’ its laws, 
standards, values and norms.’21 Most of the literature on EU external trade and 
17 I. vianello, ‘Guaranteeing Respect for Human Rights in the EU’s External Relations: What 
Role for administrative Law?’ in S. Poli, supra note 8, at 35.
18 See L. Bartels, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extrater-
ritorial Effects’ 25 European Journal of International law 2014, 1071-1091; E. Cannizzaro, ‘The 
EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects: A Reply to Lo-
rand Bartels’ 25 European Journal of International law 2014, 1093-1099; C. Ryngaert, ‘EU Trade 
Agreements and Human Rights: From Extraterritorial to Territorial Obligations’ 20 International 
Community of law Review 2018, 374-393.
19 v. Kube, supra note 16.
20 A. Dashwood, ‘Article 47 TEU and the relationship between first and second pillar compe-
tences’ in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.) law and practice of Eu external relations (New 
york: Cambridge University Press 2008), p.85 and footnote 44; Piet Eeckhout, External relations 
of the European union (New york: Oxford University Press 2004), at 473. 
21 S. Meunier and K. Nicolaïdis, ‘The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power’ 13 Jour-
nal of European Public Policy 2006, 906-925; A. Marx et al., ‘Protecting labour rights in a globaliz-
ing world: an introduction’ in A. Marx et al. (eds.), Global Governance of labour Rights Assess-
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its relationship with human rights has accordingly focused on the effectiveness 
of EU’s instruments in bringing a change or securing compliance with human 
rights in third countries.22
This section wants to provide a different angle: it argues that a combined 
reading of Articles 207 TFEU and 21(1) and 3(5) TEU allows liberation from the 
traditional understandings of the EU as a global trade actor that is expected to 
promote fundamental rights globally ‘through’ its trade agreement, and to prompt 
an exploration of the protection of fundamental rights ‘in’ trade; in the sense of 
making sure that trade agreements do not become, as of themselves, sources 
or intensifiers of downward pressures on fundamental rights. 
The table below is an attempt to unpack what the combined reading of Articles 
207(1) TFEU, 21 TEU and 3(5) TEU can imply in terms of: (a) what the EU is 
expected to pursue (object) in relation to its external relations, and the extent 
to which these objects encompass fundamental rights; (b) what the EU is ex-
pected to do (action) in its external dimension in relation to fundamental rights; 
and then (c) it explores and questions the meaning of ‘EU’s external action’ and 
similar phrasings such as ‘in its relations with the wider world’; given the ab-
stractness of these phrasings, it tries to highlight specific instances where EU’s 
action is required and/or possible, for instance ‘when defining’, ‘developing’, 
and also ‘implementing’ areas of the Union’s external action.23 In this respect, 
EU trade agreements are regarded as specific instances ‘developing’ and ‘imple-
menting’ the EU’s external relations in trade, and essentially the Union’s Com-
mon Commercial Policy as an area of the Union’s external action.24
ing the Effectiveness of Transnational Public and Private Policy Initiatives (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2015) at 4-5. 
22 See inter alia L. Campling et al. ‘Can labour provisions work beyond the border? Evaluat-
ing the effects of EU free trade agreements’ 155 International labour Review 2016, 357-382; J. 
Orbie et al., ‘The Impact of Labour Rights Commitments in EU Trade Agreements: The Case of 
Peru’ 5 Labour Standards in a Global Environment 2017, 6-18; A. Marx et al. (eds.) supra note 21; 
S. Poli (ed.) supra note 8.
23 Art.21(3) Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13 (here-
after, TEU).
24 Art.21(1) TEU: 1. The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidar-
ity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.
Table 1: The Union’s mandate to respect and promote fundamental rights in its external relations.
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25262728
The table should help to visualise that principles and objectives of the Union’s 
external action, which include human rights and the Union’s values, not only 
have to be ‘pursued’ and ‘promoted’,29 but also have to be ‘respected’, ‘upheld’ 
and ‘safeguarded’30 – the timing of this being ‘in the development and imple-
mentation of the different areas of the Union’s external action.’31 This suggests 
that the EU’s external action itself should i.a. ‘respect’, ‘safeguard’, ‘consolidate 
and support’ principles and values of fundamental rights. To the extent that trade 
agreements can be considered concrete manifestations of the ‘EU’s external 
action’, it could be argued that as of themselves they should be consistent with 
such principles and objectives, and therefore ‘respect’, ‘safeguard’ and ‘uphold’ 
fundamental rights. 
25 Art.21(2)(a) TEU: 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and 
shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safe guard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
26 Art.21(2)(b) TEU: (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the principles of international law;
27 Art.21(3) TEU: The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s 
external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.
28 Art.3(5) TEU: 5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote 
its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the 
rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
29 Art.21(3), Art.3(5) TEU.
30 Art.21(3), Art.3(5) TEU, Art.21(2)(a) TEU.
31 Art.21(3) TEU.
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Understanding the articles this way enables a different perspective on how 
fundamental rights are addressed in the context of trade agreements, and how 
their protection should be pursued in practice. Fundamental rights would not 
represent external objectives alone, but would become inherent objectives to 
EU external trade. Such reading suggests two views: not only that trade can 
and has to work as an instrument for the pursuit of fundamental rights objectives 
externally; but that also the Union’s external action, and in fact the trade agree-
ments themselves, should be consistent with such principles and objectives, 
including fundamental rights. This can imply that trade agreements should not 
undermine the protection of fundamental rights as a minimum (‘respect’), and 
can be understood as having to ensure their protection (‘safeguard’).
Such a different understanding is also allowed by Article 207(1) TFEU,32 
wherein the second sentence states that the CCP of the Union ‘shall be con-
ducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external 
action.’ [emphasis added] This sentence was not present in previous versions 
of the treaties,33 and in fact represents a novelty of the Treaty of Lisbon. How-
ever, it is not clear, generally speaking, what ‘conducting’ a policy ‘in the context 
of principles’ could mean. Arguably, a less vague wording could have been used, 
such as ‘shall respect and promote’ the principles of the Union’s external action. 
For instance, as regards the EU’s foreign and security policy, the EU treaties 
have typically specified that the Union and its Member States shall ‘define and 
implement’ a common foreign and security policy, ‘the objectives of which shall 
be’, i.a. to safeguard ‘common values.’34 yet in this case, the focus on the ‘ob-
jectives’ clearly alludes to an outward perspective. The legacy of this provision 
is now Article 21(1) TEU,35 which deploys a vague phrasing in its first paragraph, 
namely ‘shall be guided by’, similar to Article 207(1) TFEU. Arguably, it is pre-
cisely the vagueness of the wording of Article 207(1) TFEU that allows embrac-
ing a broader, normative understanding of the relationship between the EU’s 
external action in trade and fundamental rights.
2. THE EU’S APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN POST-
LISBON FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
2.1 Labour and Data privacy Rights in EU fTAs with other Developed 
Economies
The post-Lisbon EU trade agreements with Canada, Singapore and Japan, as 
well as what would have been the TTIP, do not include a chapter on fundamen-
32 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/47 (hereafter, TFEU).
33 See Art.113 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1 (Treaty of Maastricht) (hereafter, 
EC Treaty), Art.113 Treaty establishing the European Community [1997] OJ C340/1 (Amsterdam 
consolidated version (hereafter, EEC Treaty) and Art.133 Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity [2001] OJ C80/1 (Nice consolidated version).
34 Art.J.1 EC Treaty and EEC Treaty.
35 Art.21(1),(2)(a) and (2)(b) TEU.
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tal rights, yet can be understood as still providing a series of mechanisms aimed 
at their protection.36 Starting with labour rights, relevant provisions are to be 
found in the so-called Trade and Sustainable Development chapters.37 With 
slight variations and different configurations, a taxonomy of the provisions in-
cluded across trade agreements can be largely classified as displayed in the 
table below. 
In addition to these, CETA is the only trade agreement that includes commit-
ments in relation to labour rights beyond core labour standards, and which refers 
to the ILO Decent Work Agenda and the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for 
a Fair Globalization, and ‘other international commitments’, which are listed: 
health and safety at work, including the prevention of occupational injury or ill-
ness and compensation in cases of such injury or illness; establishment of 
acceptable minimum employment standards for wage earners, including those 
not covered by a collective agreement; and non-discrimination in respect of 
working conditions, including for migrant workers.38 
With respect to data privacy rights, a very small number of provisions can be 
found, limitedly the chapters on financial services, telecommunications (or elec-
tronic communications) and e-commerce. They usually require the Parties to 
‘adopt or maintain appropriate safeguards to protect privacy and personal data’;39 
and make data privacy rights part of general exceptions, allowing derogation 
36 See v. Depaigne, supra note 11.
37 The Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, 
and recently the EU-Singapore FTA, include a specific subsection on Trade and Labour, but in 
practice the commitments remain the same.
38 Art.23.3(2) and (3) CETA.
39 See e.g. Art.8.54 EU-Singapore FTA.
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from a more general commitment to liberalise trade in services.40 Unlike the 
provisions on labour rights, provisions on data privacy rights do not require the 
Parties to promote or realise certain standards via their laws, nor to cooperate 
on the matter. The underlying idea, as it will be explained below, is to avoid 
including substantive standards related to data privacy rights in the trade agree-
ments. Even though not envisaged prior to the negotiations, the EU-Japan trade 
talks led to parallel negotiations on an adequacy decision on their level of pro-
tection of personal data.41 On this path, the EU has initiated similar negotiations 
with trade partners with which it had concluded trade agreements, such as South 
Korea, and is contemplating doing the same with Singapore. At present, the EU 
maintains the Privacy Shield with the US, a partial adequacy decision with 
Canada.
Beyond these provisions specifically on labour and data privacy rights, three 
additional mechanisms can be considered as providing room for protection. 
First, clauses on the right to regulate have been included to reaffirm the right of 
the Parties to pursue their public policy objectives. Overall, these can be found 
in the chapters on trade and sustainable development and in the chapters 
regulating services and investment. Safeguards under these formulations have 
been introduced to address concerns that regulatory cooperation and investment 
chapters would have restrained the regulatory space or even prevented each 
Party to adopt new regulatory measures, particularly in the public interest. It has 
been argued that such provisions could be invoked or relied upon by the Parties 
to justify the adoption of measures that are necessary to protect and ensure 
respect of certain rights, while preventing regulatory chill effects.42 However, 
they do not imply a proactive stance, representing a rather defensive, and not 
absolute, guarantee. Similarly, general exceptions are a second means by which 
the Parties retain their possibility to derogate from the agreement to introduce 
measures in favour of, e.g., protection of public morals and public order, public 
40 CETA also specifically provides that, in cases of transfers of financial information that in-
volves personal information, ‘such transfers should be in accordance with the legislation govern-
ing the protection of personal information of the territory of the Party where the transfer has origi-
nated.’ (Art.13.15(2) CETA). In practice, any transfer originating from the EU will have to fall within 
the restrictive EU standards of protection, and that as such, there is no indication that standards 
for data protection would be lowered. See W. Berka, ‘CETA, TTIP, TiSA, and Data Protection’ in S. 
Griller et al. (eds.), Mega-Regional Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA; New orientations 
for Eu External Economic Relations (New york: Oxford University Press 2017) 178-179; K. Irion 
et al., ‘Trade and Privacy: Complicated Bedfellows? How to achieve data protection-proof free 
trade agreements’ (2016) independent study commissioned by BEUC et al., Amsterdam, Institute 
for Information Law (IviR), p.43. On the other hand, it has been also argued that the use of the 
language ‘should’ does not lead to a binding obligation and that has been weakened if compared 
to the version preceding the legal scrubbing. See A. Wessels, ‘CETA will harm our privacy’ (15 
April 2016), available at <https://blog.ffii.org/ceta-will-harm-our-privacy/>.
41 See E. Fahey and I. Mancini, ‘The EU as an Intentional or Accidental Convergence Actor? 
Learning from the EU-Japan Data Adequacy Negotiations’ International Trade law and Regula-
tion 2020 (forthcoming).
42 v. Depaigne, supra note 11; L. Bartels, ‘Human Rights, Labour Standards and Environ-
mental Standards in CETA’, university of Cambridge Faculty of law Research Paper No.13/2017, 
12-16.
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life and health, the environment, privacy and national security.43 yet again, they 
do not provide for a positive relationship between trade reform and fundamen-
tal rights issues related to it.44
Finally, human rights conditionality clauses could also be understood as 
providing a mechanism for fundamental rights protection. Some have seen in 
the human rights conditionality clauses an additional venue via which labour 
rights could be protected.45 However, these clauses have seldom been invoked 
by the EU to suspend trade benefits,46 and their scope is usually one that envis-
ages an outrageous violation of human rights of the magnitude of coups d’état. 
Furthermore, the EU’s practice has recently been to include these clauses in 
political agreements (called Strategic Partnership Agreements or Framework 
Agreements) which are negotiated parallel to the trade agreements: they are 
not binding and their relationship to the trade agreement remains often very 
vague. 
Having briefly outlined what can be found in relation to fundamental rights in 
the new generation of EU’s trade agreements, the next section turns to the 
arguments that back such an approach, and explains essentially why so little is 
there. The way fundamental rights are dealt with in EU trade agreements reflects 
underlying assumptions and open standpoints in relation to their linkage, which 
are used to justify such an approach. However, as it will be shown, they raise 
a series of concerns from a fundamental rights perspective.
2.2 Arguments backing the Current Approach to fundamental Rights 
in EU fTAs
a. Fundamental Rights are ‘non-negotiable’
One of the main arguments is that fundamental rights are ‘non-negotiable’, and 
as such, should fall outside trade negotiations and trade agreements altogeth-
er. This has been mostly manifested and voiced in relation to data protection, 
and particularly during the trade negotiations with the US and Japan. In a speech 
in the US, amid TTIP negotiations, vice-President of the Commission, viviane 
Reding warned ‘against bringing data protection to the trade talks’, for data 
protection ‘is a fundamental right and as such it is not negotiable.’47 Similarly, 
when faced with Japanese demands to discuss data protection-related issues, 
the Commission said that data protection ‘is a fundamental right in the Euro-
43 S.M. Walker, The Future of Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements (In-
tersentia 2009), p.57.
44 S.M. Walker, supra note 43. 
45 L. Bartels, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade 
Agreements’ 40 legal Issues of Economic Integration 2013, 297-313.
46 T. Novitz, ‘Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between ‘Human Rights’ and 
‘Sustainable Development’?’ in H. Gott, supra note 4, p.129.
47 v. Reding, ‘Towards a more dynamic transatlantic area of growth and investment’ (29 October 
2013), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/SPEECH_13_867>.
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pean Union and is therefore not up for negotiation.’48 The Commission’s open 
position in respect to trade and fundamental rights is clearly that fundamental 
rights are non-negotiable and should therefore not be dealt with in trade agree-
ments. 
It is totally logical and understandable that the EU does not want to compro-
mise the level of protection of fundamental rights by making them objects of 
trade negotiations. The trade realm is a particularly sensitive setting where this 
could occur, as the rhetoric is usually one of ‘cutting the red tape.’49 On the 
other hand, what does it mean that fundamental rights are not negotiable in the 
context of trade negotiations? What would ‘negotiation of fundamental rights’ 
imply in practice? Such an approach arguably raises a series of concerns. The 
first is the implication of excluding altogether any discussion relating to funda-
mental rights in the context of trade. Even though the Commission’s stance aims 
at ensuring that levels of protection are not compromised, it simultaneously 
removes any positive action or consideration for ensuring that fundamental 
rights are not compromised by the trade agreement itself once in place. 
Second, one could argue that negotiations on data protection have indeed 
taken place, in the context of data adequacy negotiations with Japan. Here, the 
benchmark, or starting point of reference, for the assessment of adequacy was 
the EU legal framework on data protection (GDPR).50 yet the outcome of such 
negotiations has been criticised for not providing a true equivalent level of pro-
tection; while others have also noticed how the alleged convergence of the 
Japanese and EU legal framework on data protection has been reached in a 
way that only personal data of EU citizens have been granted additional safe-
guards, leaving much unchanged for Japanese citizens’ personal data. One 
could argue that, in this case, data protection emerges as a clear defensive 
interest of the EU when deepening trade relations with third countries. At the 
same time, the EU-Japan adequacy talks can inform a different understanding 
of ‘negotiations’: not as something that only leads to downwards pressures on 
the levels of protection, but one that can aim at achieving upwards convergence 
of standards. 
Third, the argument that fundamental rights are not for negotiation raises the 
question of why trade agreements include provisions on the protection of labour 
standards: are labour standards not fundamental rights? These provisions only 
concern ‘core’ internationally agreed labour standards: they are understood as 
guaranteeing a ‘level playing field’, and thus represent a minimum floor of labour 
rights for which there would be no lower levels, hence in fact nothing to be 
‘negotiated.’ Asking more would certainly prove very controversial and raise 
much opposition. yet while trade agreements include provisions on minimum 
48 European Commission, ‘Key elements of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement’, 
Press release (18 April 2018), available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/MEMO_18_3326>.
49 v. Reding, supra note 47.
50 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
OJ L 119 (hereafter, GDPR).
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levels of labour protection, no corresponding provisions exist for data protection, 
for instance referring to the OECD Privacy Guidelines or the APEC Privacy 
Framework (the latter having been included, for instance, by Canada and the 
US in their newly concluded trade agreement with Mexico).51 Instead, data 
protection occupies a complex place in trade agreements,52 and the reference 
benchmark for (albeit parallel) adequacy decisions is the strictest legal framework 
in the world, namely the GDPR. Most importantly, an explanation for the minimum 
labour standards lies in the Union’s limited competences in labour matters53 and 
the scope of Common Commercial Policy, which result in the impossibility for 
the EU alone to include new substantive obligations in relation to i.a. labour in 
its trade agreements.54 yet there remains an underlying contradiction, or inco-
herence, in the argument that fundamental rights are non-negotiable. This is 
reflected in the differential treatment of the two sets of rights: while for labour 
standards it is generally accepted to have the lowest common denominator, for 
data protection it is the highest standard that is maintained. 
b. ‘Trade agreements are for trade’ 
Recently, the EU Commission has also been outspoken about the fact that trade 
agreements are essentially for trade, done to liberalise trade and make it less 
costly.55 This position contends that trade agreements cannot become the ve-
hicles for everything and anything. Whilst one should concede that EU trade 
agreements now go far beyond anything that had ever been included for fun-
damental rights, this logic remains highly problematic from a fundamental rights 
perspective, inasmuch as fundamental rights are considered to form part of a 
broader category of ‘non-trade objectives.’ There is similar scepticism among 
EU policy officials, economists and academics about the usefulness of provi-
sions on, for instance, environment and/or labour rights in trade agreements.56 
The argument is either that trade agreements should be primarily for trade,57 or 
51 Article 19.8 Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, 
and Canada.
52 See Section 2.1.
53 More precisely, it is a shared competence, see Articles 3 and 4 TFEU.
54 See Opinion 2/15 (Singapore FTA), ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, paras. 164 and 471 (hereafter 
Opinion 2/15).
55 See DG Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström at Civil Society Dialogue, available at <ht-
tps://webcast.ec.europa.eu/civil-society-dialogue-with-cecilia-malmstrom>.
56 See i.a. R.J. Flanagan, Globalization and labor Conditions (New york: Oxford University 
Press 2006).
57 L. Campling et al., ‘Can labour provisions work beyond the border? Evaluating the effects 
of EU free trade agreements’ 155 International labour law Review 2016, 357-382; F. C. Ebert, 
‘Labour provisions in EU trade agreements: What potential for channelling labour standards-
related capacity building?’ 155 International labour law Review 2015, 407-433; E. Postnikov and 
I. Bastiaens, ‘Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU preferential trade 
agreements’ 21 Journal of European Public Policy 2014, 923-940; J. M. Siroen, ‘Labour provi-
sions in preferential trade agreements: Current practice and outlook’ 152 International labour 
Review 2013, 85-106; L. van Den Putte and J. Orbie, ‘EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the 
Surprising Rise of Labour Provisions’ 31 International Journal of Comparative labour law and 
Industrial Relations 2015, 263-283; A. Marx and J. Soares, ‘Does integrating labour provisions in 
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that such provisions are not effective in achieving compliance to certain stan-
dards by the third country: whereas some would advocate for a change in the 
approach, others would still be sceptical about their usefulness altogether.58 
With respect to the first argument, a series of developments clearly show that 
trade agreements have already for a long time expanded beyond purely trade-
related matters. And this is so even if one were to exclude the newly-introduced 
‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters. The new generation of EU FTAs 
is marked by a high degree of ambition in terms of the liberalisation pursued 
and matters to be regulated under trade agreements. For instance, CETA and 
EUJEPA now include chapters on Regulatory Cooperation, which is something 
that has traditionally been undertaken outside the negotiations of trade agree-
ments, often in much looser forms. In general, the new generation of EU FTAs 
includes a series of so-called ‘WTO-X’ issues, such as anti-corruption and trans-
parency, which are not part of the WTO legal framework, and whose link to 
trade, strictly-speaking, could be questioned. The widening of the scope of FTAs 
is at once inevitable in the context of an increasingly interconnected and digi-
talised world, with structural changes having altered the way goods are produced 
and exchanged. A parallel can be drawn with the gradual expansion of the scope 
of the EU Common Commercial Policy, which has been interpreted as a reflec-
tion and adjustment ‘to the constantly evolving international trade environment.’59 
Hence the scope of trade agreements has been enlarged to such an extent that 
FTAs are not strictly-speaking about trade anymore; or they might be, but be-
cause the nature of trade itself has changed, in a way that it has raised the 
relevance of more matters in relation to it.
This backdrop has two related implications: first, that arguing trade agree-
ments cannot become the hub for everything and anything misses the empirics 
of the current situation, and can thus hardly hold when used to reply to demands 
regarding fundamental rights; and second, that as the scope of trade agreements 
expands and touches upon a wider array of issues, its reach is also more liable 
to have an impact on fundamental rights, which thereby warrants scrutiny of 
potential collisions with fundamental rights. It is noticeable how current discus-
sions on the inclusion of a chapter on gender in trade agreements has been put 
forward as an additional issue to be tackled via trade agreements. And it is even 
more remarkable how much more emphasis has been placed on explaining how 
trade negatively affects women more than men: no such discourses have 
emerged with respect to labour, explaining and recognising how trade agree-
ments might have an impact of labour rights. Hence if one is to counter conten-
free trade agreements make a difference? An exploratory analysis of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights in 13 EU trade partners’ in J. Wouters et al. (eds.), Global Governance 
through Trade: Eu Policies and Approaches (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2015); K. 
Banks, ‘Trade, Labor and International Governance: An Inquiry into the Potential Effectiveness 
of the New International Labour Law’ 32 Berkeley Journal of labor and Employment law 2011, 
45-142.
58 A. G. Brown and R. M. Stern, ‘What are the issues in using trade agreements to improve 
international labor standards?’ 7 World Trade Review 2008, 331-357.
59 P. Koutrakos, Eu International Relations law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2nd edition 2015) 
p.71.
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tions that FTAs are about trade and cannot be loaded with too many issues, it 
is important for any argument in favour of fundamental rights to spell out their 
relevance and linkage with trade. 
With respect to the second argument, namely that provisions on labour rights 
are not effective in prompting positive change in the third country, it is clear that 
the assumption is one that sees ensuring fundamental rights protection as an 
issue to be tackled only by the third country alone. yet it is argued that this 
misses the point of having labour provisions in trade agreements, and a more 
thorough understanding of their relationship with trade. Alternatively, they be-
come an internal EU’s cause for concern when contemplated from an eco-
nomic perspective: the concern is that the third country will lower its labour 
standards, hence altering the relative terms of trade and affecting workers at 
home – a rationale that, as discussed further below, remains very narrow-sight-
ed from a fundamental rights perspective, as it only contemplates the rights of 
EU citizens. Related to this, and in addition to the outspoken arguments for the 
current approach to fundamental rights in trade agreements, it is worth consid-
ering an underlying assumption that rows against more compelling contemporary 
understandings of linkages between trade and fundamental rights.
c. Fundamental Rights protection as ‘a problem of third countries’
Specifically with respect to the linkage of trade agreements and fundamental 
rights, an underlying assumption is that the protection of fundamental rights, 
yet more often in this case ‘human rights’, is an ‘external problem.’ This has 
been traditionally the case with conditionality clauses60 and the Generalised 
System of Preferences.61 The recent EU Commission’s Communication on 
Trade, Growth and World Affairs of 2010 similarly states that through trade, the 
EU should aim to encourage partners ‘to promote the respect of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment, and good governance.’62 Again, the target 
partners in this case are developing countries, while nothing is mentioned about 
the understanding and role of human rights with more economically advanced 
countries, which were the main trade partners targeted by the Global Europe 
Strategy at the basis of the new generation of EU trade agreements.
yet also in the context of the Post-Lisbon trade agreements with developed 
economies, potential breaches of fundamental rights seem to remain a problem 
of third countries: the inclusion of provisions that commit the Parties to core 
labour standards and fundamental ILO Conventions which all EU Member States 
have already ratified leads one to wonder about its added-value. Conversely, 
one could see some added value to the EU’s partners of the latest trade nego-
tiations: at the time of the negotiations, Canada, the US, Singapore and Japan 
60 Had the trade partner committed an outrageous violation of human rights, the EU could 
have suspended the trade agreement.
61 Preferential access can be withdrawn where the trade partner fails to ratify or implement a 
series of human rights instruments.
62 European Commission, ‘Trade, Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy as a core compo-
nent of the EU’s 2020 strategy’, COM(2010) 612 final (2010).
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were all missing ratification of some of the Fundamental ILO Conventions. While 
the trade negotiations with Canada, for what would have become CETA, have 
triggered Canada’s ratification of the ILO Convention on the right to organise 
and collective bargaining, discussions on the inclusion of ILO commitments 
have proven very controversial in the negotiations with the US and Japan, both 
which are presently missing ratification of some important ILO Conventions. 
While the EU-US talks for TTIP have failed, it has to be seen whether commit-
ments under EUJEPA will bring about changes on the Japanese side in terms 
of ILO Conventions ratification. yet again, this perspective leads to an outward-
look on the issue.
Additionally, Labour standards are reportedly included in trade agreements 
between developed countries to counter claims of protectionism by developing 
countries. Therefore, it has been suggested that the EU, to counter such ac-
cusation, has to include the same provisions in agreements with developed 
countries. However, what this entire argument reveals is the assumption that 
fundamental rights are only an issue for concern outside EU borders.63 Develop-
ing countries have traditionally opposed the inclusion of provisions on labour 
standards and similar terms within the WTO framework, relying on the argument 
that these clauses are disguised protectionist measures. On a related note, 
while the EU maintains that its demands in relation to labour do not go beyond 
core labour standards, and should therefore meet no opposition by developing 
countries, discussions at the WTO on e-commerce, supported by the EU, are 
being accused of ‘digital colonialism.’64 In any case, justifying the inclusion of 
labour provisions in FTAs with developed countries because of possible accusa-
tions by developing countries is a window dressing that misses the purpose, 
and emerges in fact as a very narrow and dry understanding of the relationship 
between labour protection and trade agreements. 
Finally, the discussion on sanctions for breaches of labour rights reveals 
similar assumptions. The whole debate around labour rights in trade agreements 
typically ends up being narrowed down to the discussion on having binding 
mechanisms for their enforcement and the possibility of imposing sanctions on 
the trade partner. While not irrelevant, it reveals that concerns are about viola-
tions of labour rights abroad, rather than at home. In this sense, the idea pur-
ported is the same that has dominated trade agreements with developing 
countries: namely using trade agreements as tools, or ‘sticks and carrots’, to 
trigger compliance with human rights in third countries. Interestingly enough, in 
the trade negotiations with Canada, it was the EU that rejected the Canadian 
proposal to include the possibility of having sanctions in relation to the trade 
and sustainable development chapter, revealing concerns about its own labour 
protection.65 Furthermore, the discussion on sanctions reflects an understand-
ing of labour rights which considers them as exogenous and independent from 
63 Informal interview with policy official from the European Commission.
64 D. James, ‘Big tech seeks to cement digital colonialism through the WTO’, ALAI’s maga-
zine No 542: Social justice in a digitalized world, 24 June 2019.
65 B. M. Araujo, ‘Labour Provisions in EU and US Mega-regional Trade Agreements: Rhetoric 
and Reality’ 67 International and Comparative law Quarterly 2018, at 242.
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the trade agreement, i.e. which focuses on the (possibly precarious) situation 
of labour protection in the third country, regardless of the trade agreement. Such 
a perspective fails to question inherent challenges and pressures posed by the 
trade agreement upon the enjoyment of fundamental rights also within EU bor-
ders.66
3. WHy PROBLEMATIC FROM A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIvE: OvERLOOKING INTRINSIC LINKAGES BETWEEN 
TRADE AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
From a fundamental rights perspective, three main flaws are highlighted here 
in the EU’s current approach to fundamental rights in trade agreements: first, it 
overlooks the economically developed nature of the trade partner, for which 
fundamental rights would not be a development issue (3.1); second, it omits 
contextualisation in an era of globalisation and digitalisation, which increases 
the relevance of labour and data flows to trade; and which puts additional pres-
sure on potential adverse effects of trade agreements on fundamental rights 
(3.2); and third, it overlooks new features of the ‘new generation’ of trade agree-
ments that warrant exploration in their linkage with and impact upon fundamen-
tal rights (3.3).
3.1 fundamental Rights in the context of fTAs with Economically 
Developed Trade partners
What has taken the name of ‘new generation’ of EU trade agreements is the 
result of the EU Global Strategy. Under the latter, the EU targeted ‘economi-
cally significant trading partners’ and ‘industrialised states that [could] offer the 
greatest potential for economic growth’67 in North America as much as Asia. 
Negotiations were then initiated with South Korea, Canada, the US, Singapore 
and Japan. It is argued here that the way fundamental rights have been dealt 
66 See Sections 3.2 and 3.3. The (down)side of this latter argument, however, is the risk of 
embroiling in arguments that would require the establishment of a link to trade before trigger-
ing any action, which is extremely difficult to prove. This argument yet goes beyond the scope 
and main thesis of this paper: the aim is not to identify how enforcement could be triggered, but 
rather provide a critique of the EU’s current approach in understanding the relationship between 
fundamental rights and trade agreement. Suffice to say that while the link between an instance 
of lowering, e.g., labour standards and facilitation of trade is indeed usually required for the ac-
tion to be brought, the relevant provisions of the FTAs dealing with labour rights do not elaborate 
on the features of this link: there is no description, nor examples are provided, as to how trade 
agreements could have such a link, for which action could be triggered. This again shows a lack of 
appreciation, or underestimation, of trade and fundamental rights linkages. As shown below, the 
idea of the paper is to trigger a change in perspective and advocate for the inclusion of provisions 
in the trade agreements that would address these linkages, and prevent, or at least minimise, and 
not intensify, potential adverse effects on fundamental rights in the first place. Issues of dispute 
settlement remain outside the scope of this paper.
67 L. McKenzie and K. L. Meissner, ‘Human Rights Conditionality in European Union Trade 
Negotiations: the Case of the EU-Singapore FTA’ 55 Journal of Common Market Studies 2017, 
832-849.
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with in the resulting trade agreements68 (including TTIP had it been successful) 
ignores the fact that the trade partner is not a developing country. Instead, the 
EU Commission should have taken into consideration that those trade agree-
ments were being negotiated with developed countries, for which fundamental 
rights concerns arising from a trade agreement would probably differ from those 
of a developing country. 
Developing countries usually argue that they do not have the economic ca-
pacity or tools to achieve the degree of fundamental rights protection demand-
ed by developed countries, and essentially look at social clauses as disguised 
protectionism. It is typically in these cases, where the trade partner is one where 
breaches of basic human rights are more likely, that the EU has adopted an 
approach ‘through trade’, aimed at changing the situation in the third country, 
by supporting mechanisms which promote human rights compliance. This crit-
icism is not intended to suggest that the current provisions would be redundant 
in trade agreements with developed countries. This is particularly so since, as 
mentioned before, third countries might not have ratified some of the fundamen-
tal ILO conventions; and even when these were ratified, it might in fact not be 
enough.69 Rather, some have suggested that the EU’s trade instruments ‘to 
promote and uphold human rights be tailored to the specificities of the countries 
that are parties to a given agreement’, including at the implementation, monitor-
ing and enforcement levels.70 While EU policy officials recognise that conclud-
ing trade agreements with developed countries is a totally different matter from 
FTAs with developing ones, this is not reflected in the way fundamental rights 
are dealt with in trade agreements. 
From a fundamental rights perspective, one would wish that, particularly with 
countries such as Canada and the US, the EU recognised the economically 
developed nature of the trade partner and were more ambitious in thinking about 
fundamental rights in trade, beyond basic human rights. More creativity and 
thorough exploration is needed when considering the relationship between 
fundamental rights and trade agreements in the context of present challenges 
to labour and data privacy rights. The economically developed nature of the 
trade partners enables thinking of fundamental rights as a matter of intrinsic 
relevance to trade agreements in an era of globalisation and increasing inequal-
ity. This would permit not condemning trade agreements in their entirety, but 
finding ways to avoid making them intensifiers of downward pressures on fun-
damental rights by globalisation and digitalisation. 
For instance, this could imply that safeguards are either embedded ‘in’ trade 
agreements to prevent or cushion such adverse effects; or in mechanisms 
parallel to trade agreements, and having similar purpose, but whose implemen-
tation would become an obligation in the trade agreement, in light of their op-
eration and implications for fundamental rights. A second way of conceiving of 
fundamental and trade agreements between developed countries could in fact 
68 See Section 2.1
69 World Bank, World Development Report 2013 on Jobs (World Bank 2012), pp.32-33.
70 S. velluti, ‘The promotion and integration of human rights in EU external trade relations’ 32 
utrecht Journal of International and European law 2016, pp.41-68.
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turn to the rights of ‘distant others’, namely citizens in fourth countries: not so 
much as a matter of worldwide mission for human rights promotion, as it seems 
the case in the current discussions between the EU and Canada;71 but rather, 
as a matter of European and trade partner’s companies’ conduct abroad, in a 
context of global value chains.72 While trade agreements include a few provi-
sions on corporate social responsibility, these are usually hortatory, besides 
being very vague, as much as overlooking controversies and ambiguities sur-
rounding the concept of CSR itself. Arguably, there needs to be more consid-
eration of the present context of globalisation and digitalisation, and how trade 
agreements might become companions for further downward pressures on the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights.
3.2 A Context of globalisation and Digitalisation putting pressures on 
fundamental Rights
The EU’s current approach to fundamental rights in trade agreements omits 
contextualisation in an era of globalisation and digitalisation, which increase the 
relevance of labour and data flows to trade, making them inevitable issues to 
be tackled. For practical reasons, it is not possible to assess or appreciate the 
relevance of all fundamental rights to trade, and the potential impact of trade 
agreements to all fundamental rights. As mentioned, priority is given to labour 
and data privacy rights. However, it is posited that in fact research would be 
needed to conduct such assessment for a broader range of rights.73 The need 
to tackle labour and data privacy rights stems above all from the appreciation 
of the fact that international trade economically depends on, and intertwines 
with, labour and data flows. In a context of global value chains and the data-
driven economy, labour and data underlie dynamics of international trade. 
Global trade has experienced significant structural changes – from unbundling 
of production and the emergence of global value chains; to the intensification 
of trade in services and foreign direct investment, alongside with technological 
developments – which make the economic relevance of labour and data flows 
to trade today both undeniable and pivotal.
71 European Commission, Meeting of Committee on Trade And Sustainable Development 
(13 November 2019), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/november/tra-
doc_158424.11.19%20(for%20publication).pdf>.
72 E. Lee and M. Jansen, Trade and Employment Challenges for Policy Research (Joint Study 
by the Secretariat of the ILO and the Secretariat of the WTO, 2007) (hereafter, Joint ILO-WTO 
study), available at <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/
documents/publication/wcms_091038.pdf>, p.29.
73 The sustainability impact assessments are such example but a very criticised tool: it is not 
clear always what definitions of human rights are taken into consideration, and are often criticised 
for obscure methodologies. See e.g. discussion in J. Harrison and A. Goller, ‘Trade and Human 
Rights: What Does ‘Impact Assessment’ Have to Offer?’ 8 Human Rights law Review 2008, 587-
615; and C. Kirkpatrick and C. George, ‘Methodological issues in the impact assessment of trade 
policy: experience from the European Commission’s Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) pro-
gramme’ 46 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 2006, 325-334.
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 labour and labour rights
Unlike data flows, labour has always underlay the dynamics of international 
trade. The way labour has an impact on trade is not only because, perhaps 
obviously, services and products come to life as a result of some kind of human 
activity, which inevitably becomes a factor of production in the trade of these 
goods and services; but particularly because such activity takes place within a 
legal system setting parameters to it; this will have a bearing upon the costs of 
labour, in turn affecting the competitive advantage of the country providing those 
goods and services.74 Differences in labour standards have been found to explain 
differences in international trade patterns, fostering concerns about ‘races-to-
the-bottom.’75 The intrinsic economic relevance of labour to trade has tradition-
ally justified the inclusion of international labour standards in trade agreements: 
since the 1970s, developed countries voiced concerns about cheaper labour in 
developing countries, and called for provisions on core labour standards to be 
included in the framework of the WTO.76 ‘Social dumping’ arguments are also 
usually advanced, also to refer to cases where labour standards are intention-
ally lowered for the purpose of altering the terms of trade and enhancing one 
country’s competitive advantage.77 
The EU has also embraced similar considerations in the context of its trade 
agreements. The motivation behind the inclusion of labour provisions seems to 
be only partially driven by normative considerations: while it might reflect con-
cerns about the negative consequences of social dumping on workers at home, 
it seems to overlook potential negative consequences on third or fourth countries’ 
citizens’ labour rights. Such interpretation is in line with recent arguments by 
the Commission that ‘labour protection between States can have direct and 
immediate effects on international trade and investment’ and that ‘lower stan-
dards of protection in one of the Parties can enhance trade and investment in 
its territory.’78 The justification for the inclusion of those clauses reflects the 
1970s discourses and at once reveals defensive interests of the EU. yet, argu-
ably, the EU could understand its defensive interests as going beyond concerns 
over lower labour standards in developing countries. Particularly in the context 
of trade agreements with other developed economies, the EU could think of 
ensuring that its trade partner’s and its own companies do not violate labour 
rights of workers abroad. This should be even more so in the context of increased 
economic interconnectedness and unbundling of production. In an era where 
74 A. Marx et al., ‘Protecting labour rights in a globalizing world: an introduction’ in A. Marx 
et al. (eds.), Global Governance of labour Rights Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational 
Public and Private Policy Initiatives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2015).
75 M. Artuso and C. McLarney, ‘A Race to the Top: Should Labour Standards be Included in 
Trade Agreements?’ 40 vIKAlPA The Journal for Decision Makers 2015, 1-14.
76 A. verma and G. Elman, ‘Labour Standards for a Fair Globalization for Workers of the 
World’ 16 The Good Society 2007, 57-64.
77 See e.g. in the context of future EU-UK relations, European Parliament resolution of 14 
March 2018 on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship (2018/2573(RSP)).
78 Opinion 2/15 para. 470.
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trade liberalisation is increasingly being blamed for,79 or at least recognised to 
have a bearing upon,80 increasing job insecurity and economic inequality,81 the 
aim here is to provide an overview of ways in which trade agreements are liable 
to put downward pressures on labour protection. 82 The focus is on the potential 
downward pressure on the workers at home, on the one hand, and on the work-
ers abroad, on the other. 
 Pressures on workers abroad
Liberalisation of trade has meant that trade in intermediate goods has grown in 
prominence.83 Trade liberalisation opens up market space for firms to contract 
with foreign suppliers,84 which allows production to be organised along global 
value chains whereby products are manufactured by supplier companies 
abroad.85 For instance, in the apparel industry, it has been argued that ‘trade 
79 See i.a. G. Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’ Illinois law Review 
2019 (forthcoming) at 18; q. Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliber-
alism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2018); N. Lamp, ‘How Should We Think about the 
Winners and Losers from Globalization? Three Narratives and their Implications for the Redesign 
of International Economic Agreements’, Queen’s university legal Research Paper No. 2018-102 
(2018); F. Bourguignon, The Globalization of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2015); B. Milanović, Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press 2005).
80 International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation, Making Trade 
an Engine of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment (2017), 
available at <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/wto_imf_report_07042017.pdf>.
81 B. Milanović, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 2016).
82 For reasons of space, the paper cannot go into depth about the economic theories explain-
ing the relationship between trade liberalisation and labour rights: the empirical picture varies 
greatly across countries (see i.a. Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 73, at 2), which complicates 
taking a hard line on whether trade agreements have a positive or negative impact on labour 
rights, which would additionally require addressing a number of empirical economic research and 
findings. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that while trade liberalisation in the long run is 
expected to produce positive effects on the ‘quantity’ of jobs, employment and the wages earned, 
economic studies still lack the appropriate data to assess broader standards of labour rights, 
such as the ‘quality’ or ‘conditions’ of employment, i.a. health and safety in the workplace, or job 
stability (see Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 20). Similarly, Milberg and Winkler (2011), 
who find global production networks to lead to ‘social upgrading’, by using ‘employment growth’ 
as the relevant standard, concede that their approach would not be sufficient to fully capture that 
relationship, if one were to broaden the meaning of ‘social upgrading’ to ‘decent work’, hence 
beyond employment and wages (W. Milberg and D. Winkler, ‘Economic and social upgrading 
in global production networks: Problems of theory and measurement’ 150 International labour 
Review 2011, 341-365).
83 See e.g. P. Antràs and R.W. Staiger, ‘Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements’ 102 
American Economic Review 2012, at 3140. 
84 A. Smith et al., ‘Labor Regimes, Global Production Networks, and European Union Trade 
Policy: Labor Standards and Export Production in the Moldovan Clothing Industry’ 94 Economic 
Geography 2018, 550-574.
85 A. Salmivaara, ‘New governance of labour rights: the perspective of Cambodian garment 
workers’ struggles’ 15 Globalizations 2018, 329-346; F. Mayer and G. Gereffi, ‘Regulation and 
economic globalization: Prospects and limits of private governance’ 12 Business and Politics 
2010, 1-25; K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Strengthening international regulation through transna-
tional new governance’ 42 vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 2009, 501-578; R. M. Locke, 
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liberalization’, and particularly the WTO-mandated phasing out of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement controlling trade in textile products, has enabled ‘buyers to play 
suppliers in more countries off against each other without concern for quotas 
or other barriers that had earlier restricted their sourcing options.’86 In addition, 
it has been observed that because of the falling costs of communication and 
transport, lead companies would be able to exercise a great amount of control 
on the production process, including on the ‘throughput time, costing structures, 
delivery systems, workplace organization and labour’, even when not directly 
hiring workers abroad, and not directly owning the supplier.87 What this implies 
for workers abroad has been studied extensively in the literature, and can be 
divided into studies that have found either positive outcomes in terms of higher 
employment and higher wages,88 or deepening of exploiting conditions,89 i.e. 
‘social downgrading.’90 While the facts might lie in between, it is striking that 
German firms operating in China have recently planned to leave (or relocate) 
their production, the main reason being rising labour costs.91 Two main aspects 
are worthy of attention here. 
First, regardless of better or worsening conditions, the fact remains that frag-
mented production makes it extremely difficult to identify employment relation-
ships, were one to think about how to improve them and support workers’ rights 
effectively.92 On this, the inclusion of core labour standards in trade agreements 
is largely regarded as lagging behind, whereas empowering local institutions to 
monitor what happens on the ground would be a means to address potential 
The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a global economy (New 
york: Cambridge University Press 2013).
86 M. Anner et al., ‘Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Caus-
es of Labor violations in International Subcontracting Networks’ 35 Comparative labour law & 
Policy Journal 2013, at 8.
87 S. Barrientos et al., ‘Decent work in global production networks: Framing the policy debate’ 
150 International labour Review 2011, p.302.
88 See i.a. N. M. Coe et al., ‘Global production networks: realizing the potential’ 8 Journal 
of Economic Geography 2008, 271-295; Cumbers et al., ‘The entangled geographies of global 
justice networks’ 32 Progress in Human Geography 2008, 183-201; N. Coe and M. Hess, ‘Global 
production networks, labour and development’ 44 Geoforum 2013, 4-9; A. Rossi, ‘Does economic 
upgrading lead to social upgrading in global production networks? Evidence from Morocco’ 46 
World Development 2013, 223-33; N. Coe, ‘Labour and global production networks’ in K. New-
some et al. (eds.), Putting labour in its place (London: Palgrave 2015).
89 G. Starosta, ‘Revisiting the new international division of labour thesis’ in G. Charnock and 
G. Starosta (eds.), The new international division of labour (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2016); 
A. Smith, ‘Economic (in)security and global value chains’ 8 Cambridge Journal of Regions Econo-
my and Society 2015, 439-58; K. Newsome, et al. (eds.), Putting labour in its place (London: Pal-
grave 2015); E. Baglioni, ‘Labour control and the labour question in global production networks’ 
18 Journal of Economic Geography 2018, 111–137.
90 I.e. the worsening of ‘conditions and remuneration of employment and respect for workers’ 
rights, as embodied in the concept of decent work.’ See S. Barrientos et al., supra note 87, at 301.
91 See ‘quarter of German firms in China plan to leave’, Asia Times, 12 November 2019, 
available at <https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/11/article/quarter-of-german-firms-in-china-plan-
to-leave/>.
92 See Gereffi (1999) in S. Barrientos et al., supra note 87, at 301. See also J. Kenner, ‘The 
Enterprise, Labour and the Court of Justice’ in A. Perulli and T. Treu (eds.), Enterprise and Social 
Rights (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2017).
82
CLEER PAPERS 2020/1 Mancini
labour rights violations.93 Second, the outsourcing of production creates a ‘trans-
national’ dimension that gives rise to ‘governance gaps’ or ‘deficits’ in global 
labour protection,94 making national standards falling short of being the only 
means for addressing labour.95 For instance, while some companies might have 
bilateral arrangements with local governments that would commit them to fair 
practices in relation to labour protection,96 some labour unions warn that when 
this is not the case, workers might be left without an interlocutor that could 
provide support; for instance, in situations where companies do not pay the 
wages or decide to lower them without prior consultations. Similarly, many ob-
serve how ‘it is now widely recognised that business operations affect the pub-
lic interest and can impact on a range of human rights.’97
 Pressures on workers at home
Turning to the domestic workers perspective, and in the light of what has been 
discussed in terms of trade agreements facilitating GNPs, liberalisation of trade 
has the potential to increase the price elasticity of labour demand, as substitut-
ing domestic workers with foreign workers becomes easier.98 It has been found 
that, as employers become subject to stiffer price competition, they are ‘more 
likely to threaten to lay off workers when they demand higher wages.’99 Rules 
of origin in this respect become important as they determine the amount of 
domestic labour that a product needs to ‘contain’ for it to qualify for a preferen-
tial tariff: more lenient rules of origin, in the sense of less domestic content re-
quired for it to fall under the preferential tariff, means that it will be easier for 
companies to source inputs from ‘lower cost countries.’100 Similarly, Foreign 
Direct Investment also plays a role in raising labour demand elasticities, as it 
allows ‘globalising’ production, via direct foreign affiliates or by means of inter-
 93 A. Smith et al., ‘Labor Regimes, Global Production Networks, and European Union Trade 
Policy: Labor Standards and Export Production in the Moldovan Clothing Industry’ 94 Economic 
Geography 2018, 550-574.
 94 G. Gereffi and F. W. Mayer, ‘Globalization and the Demand for Governance’ in G. Gereffi 
(ed.), The New offshoring of Jobs and Global Development (ILO 2006) p.39; K. van Wezel Stone, 
‘Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation’ 16 Michi-
gan Journal of International law 1995, 987-1028.
 95 E. de Wet, ‘Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause 
in the General Agreement On Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organization’ 17 Human Rights Quar-
terly 1995, 443-462.
 96 F. Hendrikx et al., ‘The architecture of global labour governance’ 155 International labour 
Review 2015, 339-355.
 97 See i.a. J. Wouters and N. Hachez, ‘When Rules and values Collide: How Can a Balanced 
Application of Investor Protection Provisions and Human Rights Be Ensured?’ 3 Human Rights & 
International legal Discourse 2009, at 316; S. velluti, supra note 70, at 42; T. Novitz, supra note 
46, at 124.
 98 Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 42.
 99 This could happen not only in the context of trade between developed and developing 
countries, but also in trade between developed countries. See Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 
72, at 4.
100 A. Santos, ‘The Lessons of TPP and the Future of Labor Chapters in Trade Agreements’, 
IIlJ Working Paper 2018/3 MegaReg Series (2018).
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mediate inputs.101 It has been found that even the mere possibility of threat of 
turning to source inputs from another country, or to delocalise, can affect the 
price elasticity of demand, and thus for instance weaken the possibility for work-
ers to resist wage reductions.102 One of the consequences of higher price elas-
ticity of labour demand is that workers may have to accept lower wages.103 This 
also links to another impact that has been pointed out, namely the reduction of 
governments’ ability to carry out redistributive policies, including the manipula-
tion of wages.104 Finally, higher price elasticity of labour demand may lead to a 
reduction of domestic workers’ power to bargain, as it becomes easier for em-
ployers to replace them with foreign workers.105 
A final element considered here relates to practices of offshoring tasks, which 
has become far easier today because of technology that facilitates ‘tradability 
of services.’106 Expectedly, tasks that can be performed at a distance will be 
also more likely the ones to be offshored. And this is a case where not only 
“low-skilled” jobs are likely to be affected, but also more “high-skilled” jobs that 
can be high IT intensive or transmittable, as in the case of security analysts.107 
Baldwin has also recently coined the term ‘globotics’ to refer to a mix of ‘glo-
balisation’ and ‘robotics’ that will make it easier to outsource services jobs.108 
While his suggestion for worried workers is to move to jobs that cannot be done 
by ‘globots’, it has been found that policy-makers will find it extremely difficult 
to predict next directions and new forms of employment in the digital era.109 As 
trade in services has recently witnessed a dynamic growth,110 trade agreements 
should take into consideration potential effects on labour and changes in the 
nature of employment, which might be facilitated not only by digitalisation, but 
also by further liberalisation of trade in services.111 
101 Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 43, on the basis of Scheve and Slaughter (2004).
102 Ibid, at 4.
103 In a context of higher elasticity for labour demand, it will be harder for workers to have the 
employers bearing the costs of benefits and standards, and might find themselves to accept lower 
wages to maintain these standards/benefits. Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 72, at 44.
104 Ibid, at 45.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid, at 29.
107 Ibid, at 30.
108 J. Crabtree, ‘The Globotics Upheaval by Richard Baldwin — white-collar disruption’, Fi-
nancial Times, 23 January 2019.
109 Joint ILO-WTO study, supra note 73, at 30.
110 Eurostat, International trade in services - an overview, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_trade_in_services_-_an_overview>.
111 Rules on cross-border provision of services have already been found to have competitive 
and divisive effects within the EU, see K. Debeuf, ‘The labour market is not ready for the future’, 
Euobserver, 20 November 2019, available at <https://euobserver.com/who-is-who/146470?utm_
source=euobs&utm_medium=email>.
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 Data flows and data privacy rights
Unlike labour, free flow and mobility of data have only lately become the back-
bone of trade, and particularly of what is now called ‘digital trade.’112 Different 
from e-commerce, digital trade goes beyond online purchases or sales, and 
covers more broadly those trade activities that make use of digital technologies 
for business purposes.113 The emergence of new technologies has meant that 
now ‘data’ increasingly underlie global flows of goods, services, capital as well 
as people crossing borders. It must be noted, however, that not every transfer 
of data will necessarily occur in the context of trade, and can instead be simply 
transferred or collected via a number of mechanisms unrelated to it. Cross-
border data flows become a prominent component of digital trade for instance 
when data flows are used as a tradeable commodity on its own, or when it is 
attached to goods and services crossing borders, as in the case of e-commerce 
or financial services. Businesses increasingly demand the regulation of cross-
border data flows in trade agreements via provisions that would forbid measures 
restricting their free flow.114 The discussions in the context of Brexit, and the 
demands for an adequacy decision, as opposed to more costly arrangements 
such as standard contractual clauses and non-binding codes of practices, further 
confirm the economic relevance of data to trade.115
However, concerns have arisen as to when data contains ‘personal’ data, 
prompting a debate between those advocating free flow of data and those con-
cerned with the protection of personal data. Trade has moved towards a digital 
and information space, which increases the amount of data crossing borders, 
making the protection of personal data ever more crucial. Data transfers in the 
context of cross-border services, such as financial, e-commerce and telecom-
munications, increasingly challenge the protection of personal data.116 Globally, 
countries have understood that international trade necessitates coming to terms 
with data, yet divergent approaches mean that data protection will not always 
be the priority: this raises concerns as to the protection of personal data in an 
emerging global economic order where data flows are an important component. 
Whilst trade agreements have now become important vehicles to govern trans-
border data flows,117 the regulation of data flows in the context of trade agree-
ments still seems to be a compelling challenge for the years to come. 
112 W. Berka, ‘CETA, TTIP, TiSA, and Data Protection’ in S. Griller et al. (eds.), Mega-Regional 
Trade Agreements: CETA, TTIP, and TiSA: New orientations for Eu External Economic Relations 
(New york: Oxford University Press 2017).
113 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Asia-Pacific 
Trade and Investment Report 2016: Recent Trends and Developments (2016), see Chapter 7 on 
‘Digital Trade.’
114 McKinsey Global Institute, Global Flows in a Digital Age: How Trade, Finance, People, and 
Data Connect the World Economy (Brussels: McKinsey and Company 2014).
115 O. Patel and N. Lea, ‘EU-UK Data Flows, Brexit and No-Deal: Adequacy or Disarray?’ uCl 
European Institute Brexit Insights paper (2019), available at <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-
institute/news/2019/aug/eu-uk-data-flows-brexit-and-no-deal-adequacy-or-disarray>.
116 K. Irion et al., supra note 40.
117 UNCTAD, Data protection regulations and international data flows: Implications for trade 
and development (United Nations 2016) p.36.
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On the one hand, attempts to restrict cross-border data have been qualified 
as protectionist measures, a red tape or non-tariff barriers to trade.118 Those 
who see restrictions of cross-border data as new non-tariff barriers to trade 
denounce measures that require data to be retained onshore (such as data 
localisation and local storage) and those that require businesses to have their 
physical presence on territory. Typical arguments against such measures are 
that they do not serve data security, while constituting an impediment to com-
panies’ competitive advantage. On the other hand, data protection is a funda-
mental right that should be guaranteed in the context of trade in data. Some 
have pointed at the risk of ‘data havens’, whereby data processing operations 
could end up being made in countries with less strict requirements for privacy.119 
The challenge is thus to allow data to flow across countries and reap the ben-
efits this would bring, while ensuring that personal data is protected. 
There is a need to define clear benchmarks drawing a line between, on the 
one hand, measures that amount to digital protectionism and unnecessary 
regulation impeding such flows of data; and on the other hand, measures that 
are addressed at the protection of personal data and privacy, and would there-
fore be legitimate. Whilst trade agreements might not necessarily be the place 
that most would advocate for including provisions on the protection of personal 
data, it is important to acknowledge that data today underpins global trade. Once 
it is recognised how data privacy rights are salient to data flows, and data flows 
to trade, trade agreements would need to ensure mechanisms to address these 
linkages. Inasmuch as trade agreements become more complex and far-reach-
ing, giving rise to new possible linkages with fundamental rights, the next section 
maps some of the new features of the latest EU trade negotiations that should 
be examined in relation to their impact and potential for fundamental rights 
protection.
3.3 new Linkages Emerging from new features of the post-Lisbon 
EU Trade Agreements
Moving increasingly towards deeper legal and institutional integration, the new 
generation EU trade agreements have stretched the stakes and implications for 
rights over a wider segment of people.120 Their complexity and ambition, not 
only in liberalising trade, but also in going beyond tariffs and seeking mechanisms 
for regulatory convergence and institutional arrangements, are at the basis for 
warranting exploration of new emerging linkages with fundamental rights: plac-
es and dimensions where fundamental rights could become subject to downward 
pressures, but where their protection could be arguably enhanced. What follows 
118 See e.g. J. Eger, ‘Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection 
or Non-Tariff Trade Barriers?’ 10 law and Policy in International Business 1978, 1055-1104.
119 See L. A. Bygrave, Data Protection law: Approaching Its Rationale, logic and limits (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2002); S. zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and 
the Prospects of an Information Civilization’ 30 Journal of Information Technology 2015, 75-89.
120 E. Benvenisti, ‘Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements and the Future of 
Global Public Law’ 23 Constellations 2016, 58-70.
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aims to provide an exploratory agenda of the following dimensions in their in-
tersection with fundamental rights: wider scope, new actors, regulatory coop-
eration and institution-building. 
a. Wider Scope
The new generation of EU trade agreements has widened the scope far beyond 
strictly-related trade issues. The impact on fundamental rights of new objects 
of trade agreements, such as new actors, regulatory cooperation and institu-
tions, are discussed further below. However, if one is to consider how the scope 
of trade agreements has widened in relation to fundamental rights, what emerg-
es is that the new generation EU trade agreements for the first time include the 
trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters, where provisions on labour 
rights can be found. By contrast, data privacy rights remain mostly outside, 
under formulations which yet include them as part of exceptions or by means 
of provisions requiring the Parties to ‘maintain safeguards.’ 
Regarding labour rights, while most scholars point at the hortatory nature of 
these commitments and the fact that they are not truly binding nor enforceable, 
another perspective is warranted scrutiny here, which took into consideration 
the context of downward pressures on social protection and increasing inequal-
ities. It has been observed that labour provisions mandating respect of core 
labour standards are very limited in addressing possible adverse impacts of 
trade on labour protection,121 and do not go to the core of problems related to 
job insecurity, social dumping and income inequality.122 Their inclusion in the 
TSD chapters has additionally the effect of ‘compartmentalising’ their relevance 
to those chapters, and thus of separating their protection as a self-standing 
issue. Instead, it is necessary to understand their relevance across issue areas 
within the trade agreement.123 Increasingly, other disciplines and provisions in 
trade agreements are coming under the target of labour rights advocates, such 
as rules of origin, investment, currency manipulation and public procurement.124 
125 Labour rights thus necessitate innovations and integrated approaches to not 
121 D. Rodrik, ‘What Do Trade Agreements Really Do?’ 32 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
2018, 73-90; G. Shaffer, ‘Retooling Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion’ Illinois law Review 
2019 (forthcoming); A. Santos, ‘The Lessons of TPP and the Future of Labor Chapters in Trade 
Agreements’, IIlJ Working Paper 2018/3 MegaReg Series (2018).
122 A. Santos, supra note 121.
123 See T. Novitz supra note 46, at 125.
124 G. Shaffer, supra note 121; A. Santos, supra note 121.
125 Furthermore, the Sustainability Impact Assessments of the new generation of EU trade 
agreements, whilst pointing at harming effects of some specific categories of jobs, do not provide 
tailored solutions to the problem, nor are follow-ups present in the trade agreements themselves. 
For instance, the SIA for CETA finds that ‘While high degrees of liberalisation would produce the 
greatest overall economic gains, it could negatively impact dairy in Canada and beef/pork in the 
EU. Workers in these sectors would, subsequently, be expected to be negatively impacted with 
a number of workers likely forced to shift into alternative sectors over the long-term. Maintaining 
sensitivities on these sectors would likely limit any negative social impact on these workers. It is 
unclear how expansion in agricultural employment would impact quality and decency of work. 
(…) Further, as agriculture and food processing tend to have some of the highest rates of work 
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marginalise them, but to acknowledge their interaction with all aspects of a trade 
agreement, whose features have now become more complex and far-reaching.126 
Regarding data privacy rights, the approach is one that avoids references to 
specific standards and makes them grounds for exceptions, limiting a more 
proactive stance towards their protection. As yakovleva has argued, it only 
reflects ‘the economic nature of personal data and not its dignitary nature pro-
tected as a fundamental right’, with normative concerns not being truly elevated 
to the level of economic interests.127 The lack of an international standard on 
the matter complicates what can and/or should be included in trade agreements 
about data privacy: data privacy frameworks provided by the OECD and APEC 
clearly rely on an economic, as opposed to a more normative, approach, and 
their inclusion might provide suboptimal standards for data privacy rights.128 
The EU’s approach in this respect in fact allows concluding parallel adequacy 
decisions where the main benchmark is the GDPR. However, when adequacy 
is not granted, data can still flow under other specific, and usually administra-
tively more costly, arrangements; but particularly in the light of the EU-US saga 
on the Umbrella Agreement, some may wonder as to whether requiring the trade 
partner to ‘maintain or adopt safeguards’ would be enough to ensure that data 
privacy rights are not breached. The recent EU Commission’s proposal for 
horizontal provisions on data flows seems to perpetuate such an approach, as 
it provides that ‘each Party may adopt and maintain the safeguards it deems 
appropriate to ensure the protection of personal data and privacy.’129 On the 
other hand, their horizontal nature can be contrasted with the approach to labour 
rights, and be understood as acknowledging the relevance of data to different 
aspects of trade, from telecommunications to e-commerce, financial services 
and so on. 
Arguably, the complexity of the linkage of trade respectively with labour and 
data privacy rights implies that the latter could be protected not necessarily via 
stricter commitments on a wider range of standards. Rather, it is argued here 
that more research and exploration is needed on more indirect (and possibly 
less controversial) means, as could be the incorporation of provisions on side-
issues that would indirectly bolster their protection in relation to other trade 
related injuries and fatalities, expansion of employment in Canada and the EU’s agriculture and 
food processing sectors could expose a greater number of workers to working conditions that are 
more unsafe than average. This could, in turn, produce negative consequences for the level of 
work-related stress of employees in both Canada and the EU.’ C. Kirkpatrick et al., Eu-Canada 
SIA Final Report (2011), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/september/tra-
doc_148201.pdf>, at 49. For a critique, see F.C. Ebert, ‘The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA): Are Existing Arrangements Sufficient to Prevent Adverse Effects on Labour 
Standards?’ 33 International Journal of Comparative labour law and Industrial Relations 2017, 
295-329.
126 T. Novitz, supra note 46.
127 S. yakovleva, ‘Should Fundamental Rights to Privacy and Data Protection be a Part of the 
EU’s International Trade ‘Deals’?’ 17 World Trade Review 2018, 477-508.
128 Ibid.
129 European Commission, Horizontal provisions for cross-border data flows and for personal 
data protection (in EU trade and investment agreements), available at <https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2018/may/tradoc_156884.pdf>.
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disciplines and in the context of global production networks and further liber-
alisation of services in the context of digitalisation.
b. Non-Traditional Actors
Actors that have not traditionally engaged or been interested in EU external 
trade law and policy, have mobilised in the context of the new generation of EU 
trade agreements at an unprecedented degree. Crucially, not only have they 
mobilised, but they have been enabled to do so, as the Commission and the 
Council have introduced initiatives and changed their practices to allow for a 
wider engagement by non-traditional actors of EU external trade. A series of 
consultations, civil society dialogues and transparency initiatives, including pub-
lication of documents, reflect clear attempts to trump traditional criticisms of 
‘behind closed doors’ trade negotiations. While the latter have been criticised 
until recently for excluding representation of broader constituencies with an 
interest in, not least liable to be affected by, the outcome,130 the latest EU trade 
negotiations have been praised for changing this trend, with the EU Commis-
sion’s ‘Trade for All’ strategy now being the most manifest example.131 
However, while it is easy to call for, or exhibit, more inclusiveness broadly 
speaking, it is more difficult to grasp who the actors that are given a say are, 
how different inputs are weighed, and the extent to which they embrace funda-
mental rights issues; or put differently, the extent to which such actors understand 
the relevance of fundamental rights to trade. Research, as much as policy mak-
ers, should pay special attention to whom is entitled; to provide what kind of 
input; and at what stage of the life cycle of the FTA (from the negotiation stage, 
to the implementation and new regulatory mechanisms beyond the state). Im-
portantly, actors demanding a say in trade negotiations become important 
voices underlying how trade agreements come about and what they are about. 
From a fundamental rights perspective, an exploration of linkages between 
non-traditional actors of the new generation of EU trade agreements thus could 
look at the extent to which these newly empowered actors have embraced ac-
tors advocating for the protection of fundamental rights. 
Where this was the case, the next question would be whether they are given 
meaningful venues to express their views and influence the law-making process. 
A second issue to be addressed indeed relates to cases where these actors 
could meaningfully influence the outcome of the law or not. From a fundamen-
tal rights perspective, actors speaking in favour of rights should be able to shape 
the trade agreement accordingly, and in this sense, contribute to more thorough 
understandings of the relationship between trade and fundamental rights. A vast 
amount of literature has for instance pointed at civil society actors as among 
the key candidates for achieving democratisation of global governance, and 
130 Bull et al., ‘New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of 
TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements’ 78 law and Contemporary Problems 2015, 
pp.13-14.
131 EU Commission, ‘Trade for All: a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’ (2015), 
available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf>.
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explored ways in which they could fill legitimacy deficits of law-making beyond 
the state.132 yet others have also addressed their limitations.133 Hence, this 
would mean conceiving of mechanisms that understood and addressed typical 
shortcomings of participation of civil society. These mechanisms should be 
designed with the objective of representativeness and prioritisation of funda-
mental rights in mind. They should additionally create legal venues for ‘norma-
tive’ actors to provide meaningful input at different stages of trade law-making 
and ensure that their input is taken into consideration.
c. Regulatory Cooperation 
Another typical new feature of the latest EU trade negotiations is ‘regulatory 
cooperation.’ Whilst regulatory cooperation is a concept that comprises a pan-
oply of mechanisms, it can be defined as encompassing those institutional and 
procedural mechanisms whereby actors at sub- and trans- national levels of 
law-making cooperate to bridge their regulatory divergences. It is typically un-
derstood as a means to create a level regulatory field against a context of 
regulatory divergence. In trade, divergent regulatory requirements are ‘non-
tariff’ barriers and essentially a source of costs. As trade is increasingly more 
about non-tariff barriers, regulatory cooperation provides a space for addressing 
them. In the new generation of EU FTAs, regulatory cooperation clauses provide 
a range of possibilities and activities that the Parties can undertake, leaving 
much room for both low and high ambition in terms of the degree of alignment 
to be sought. As some have observed, institutionalised forms of regulatory 
cooperation can become veritable ‘vehicles for regulatory rapprochement’, as 
the Parties commit to ‘regulatory reform and changes to the regulatory culture.’134 
Regulatory cooperation can channel deeper forms of legal and institutional in-
tegration.
Regulatory cooperation started receiving public attention, and in fact great 
opposition, in the context of the trade negotiations with the US: the way it was 
envisaged would have made the TTIP a ‘living agreement’ whereby changes to 
the agreed texts could have taken place via the activity of regulators with the 
power to advance legally binding commitments in identified areas of conver-
gence.135 Academic research has also voiced concerns as to potential demo-
132 J. Tallberg and A. Uhlin, ‘Civil Society and Global Democracy: an assessment’, in D. 
Archibugi et al. (eds.), Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (New york: 
Cambridge University Press 2011); F. Bignami, ‘Theories of civil society and global Administrative 
Law: the case of the World Bank and international development’ in S. Cassese (ed.), Research 
Handbook on Global Administrative law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016).
133 M. Bexell et al., ‘Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transna-
tional Actors’ 16 Global Governance 2010, 81-101; S. Kalm et al., ‘Civil Society Democratising 
Global Governance? Potentials and Limitations of ‘Counter-Democracy’’ Global Society 2019, 
499-519.
134 S. S. Krstic, ‘Regulatory Cooperation to Remove Non-tariff Barriers to Trade in Products: 
Key Challenges and Opportunities for the Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade Agreement’ 39 le-
gal Issues of Economic Integration 2012, at 10.
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cratic deficits of regulatory cooperation activities.136 Some have warned that 
regulatory cooperation mechanisms would fall outside the scrutiny of domestic 
institutions, hence undermining ‘traditional checks and balances characteristic 
of vibrant democracies.’137 From a fundamental rights perspective, regulatory 
cooperation becomes problematic for there are no provisions reflecting concerns 
inherently related to the protection of fundamental rights: this is so, even though 
the subject matter falling under the scope of regulatory cooperation chapters is 
either very broad;138 or specifically includes labour or e-commerce,139 for which 
labour and data privacy would become a relevant issue.140 Furthermore, regu-
latory cooperation is usually understood as a tool to facilitate trade and ‘cut the 
red tape’, less often in terms of ‘enhanced protection.’ This is reflected in the 
objectives of the relevant chapters, which is argued here to have an impact on 
how regulators will understand their role. Adding to this the potential legitimacy 
deficits that have been voiced, regulatory cooperation emerges as a new feature 
that warrants investigation on its impact on fundamental rights.
In fact, regulatory cooperation could be understood as having potential to 
contribute to the protection of fundamental rights, by providing a platform for 
mutual learning and cooperation, where challenges to fundamental rights could 
be discussed and jointly-addressed. This would require, for instance, making 
sure that the objectives of regulatory cooperation chapters are not confined to 
aims of trade and investment liberalisation, which is pivotal for the bodies in-
volved to embrace fundamental rights considerations with a view to enhance 
their protection. For a research agenda, it would be important to focus on sub-
stantive and procedural safeguards that would enable protection of fundamen-
tal rights: be it via a mandate including human rights impact assessments of 
regulatory initiatives; mandatory participatory mechanisms, and the possibility 
for the European Parliament to scrutinise the activities, as already explored by 
some scholars.141 
ments/publications/alemanno-finalpdf.pdf>; M. Cremona, ‘Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ (Guest Editorial) 52 Common Market law Review 2015, 
pp.352-353.
136 A. Alemanno, supra note 135; W. Weiß, ‘Delegation to Treaty Bodies in EU Agreements: 
Constitutional Constraints and Proposals for Strengthening the European Parliament’ 14 Euro-
pean Constitutional law Review 2018, 532-566; F. De ville and G. Siles-Brügge, TTIP: The Truth 
about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Cambridge: Polity Press 2016).
137 E. Benvenisti, supra note 120.
138 See Art.18.3(1) EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement; Art.x3.(1) TTIP - EU pro-
posal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation.
139 See Art.21.1 CETA.
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d. New Institutions Beyond the State
A common feature of the new generation of EU FTAs is the presence of claus-
es that create a plethora of new entities forming a capacious institutional archi-
tecture for the operation of the trade agreement: from joint committees, to 
specialised (sub)committees, working groups, advisory groups and fora. For 
instance, the treaty bodies created via CETA encompass a Joint Committee, a 
Regulatory Cooperation Forum, a Civil Society Forum and a series of specialised 
committees, among which a Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development. 
To varying degrees, also the FTAs with Singapore and Japan and the envisaged 
TTIP all contain institutional provisions for the creation of bodies with different 
powers and mandates. The proliferation of treaty bodies in trade agreements, 
and the powers that these bodies are granted, warrant exploration in their rela-
tion to rights. 
In studying these new institutional arrangements, some have warned against 
democracy and legitimacy problems that such bodies could entail.142 Similarly, 
others have discussed global checks and balances, transparency, parliamen-
tary control and accountability in the operation of the institutional structures that 
the latest trade initiatives create.143 It has been observed that not only would 
these bodies operate for the monitoring and implementation of the trade agree-
ments; in some cases they would also be vested with significant decision-mak-
ing powers and to create new bodies in turn.144 In these instances, they would 
emerge as autonomous institutions operating beyond the State, with uncer-
tainty as to whether they would be subject to any control and by whom. On the 
other hand, many of these new mechanisms envisage exchanges with, or even 
encompass, civil society actors. yet inasmuch as the involvement of civil society 
is envisaged under different configurations and overlapping mechanisms, some 
have argued that in the resulting framework, ‘the purpose of civil society engage-
ment is lost and genuine participation and voice is likely to fade.’145
Against this backdrop, it could be explored how fundamental rights are guar-
anteed or could be undermined under these new institutional sets-up in the 
context of trade agreements. Similarly to the emerging structures in the opera-
tion of regulatory cooperation chapters, consideration of fundamental rights 
should be given in the different elements of these new institutions, from the 
mandate to oversight and participatory mechanisms allowing and enabling dis-
courses of protection of fundamental rights. Regarding the newly-established 
committees, some suggest a more prominent role being given to the European 
Parliament, which should be given the possibility to participate in the work of 
these committees and scrutinise relevant documents.146 Regarding institution-
al arrangements for civil society participation, similar considerations as to the 
involvement of non-traditional actors could apply. A further argument that could 
142 W. Weiß, supra note 136.
143 E. Benvenisti, supra note 120.
144 W. Weiß, supra note 136.
145 T. Novitz, supra note 46, at 128.
146 W. Weiß, supra note 141.
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be made is that instead of creating new institutions beyond the state, trade 
agreements could envisage the creation of institutions domestically, as they 
would be closer to local concerns regarding potential impacts upon the enjoy-
ment of i.a. labour rights.147 Relationships and interactions between new institu-
tions and local institutions could also be spelled out, with a view to enable 
exchanges that would benefit the protection of fundamental rights. 
4. CONCLUSION: FROM FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ‘THRouGH TRADE’ 
TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ‘IN TRADE’
In the context of trade, the EU emerges as a singular global actor from a fun-
damental rights perspective: unlike other international actors, the EU’s external 
action is to be guided by interests as much as values. The Treaty of Lisbon does 
not erase the tension between market goals and respect of fundamental rights, 
it opens up the possibility for the EU to pursue fundamental rights both in and 
through trade. yet for a very long time, the EU has been a global actor through 
trade: it has taken for granted an understanding of human rights in trade that 
sees them as a development issue for third countries. No more sophisticated 
conceptualisations have been explored, making the EU’s current approach 
heavily reliant on this legacy. 
The way fundamental rights are provided protection in the Post-Lisbon new 
generation EU trade agreements emerges as outdated and not fit for purpose: 
not fit for trade relations with developed economies where fundamental rights 
concerns may differ from core labour standards, and where the economic ca-
pacity would be present to be more ambitious; not apt in a context of globalisa-
tion and new pressures for enjoyment of fundamental rights; and very 
narrow-sighted insofar as new features of such ambitious trade agreements 
that account for deeper integration would require a more thorough appreciation 
of potential linkages with fundamental rights. On this, a parallel can be drawn 
with the development of the EU Single Market and the emergence of a funda-
mental rights dimension: not only does the EU now have a Charter of Funda-
mental Rights that is part of primary law, but some scholars have also started 
addressing questions as to whether the EU could be considered a ‘human rights 
organisation.’148 The history of what started as a purely (albeit ambitious) eco-
nomic project shows how further economic integration is liable to collide with 
fundamental rights149 and evolve into something more. While fundamental rights 
have pervaded the EU internally, a lot still needs to be done externally.
The aim of this paper is to urge new conceptualisations of the relationship 
between trade agreements and fundamental rights. There is a compelling need 
to understand underlying linkages, and how trade agreements could intensify 
147 G. Shaffer, supra note 121. See also M. Barenberg, ‘Sustaining Workers’ Bargaining Pow-
er in an age of GlobalIzatIon: Institutions for the meaningful enforcement of international labor 
rights’, EPI Briefing Paper (9 October 2009).
148 A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights 
and the Core of the European Union’ 37 Common Market law Review 2000, 1307-1338.
149 See T. Novitz, supra note 46.
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negative effects upon fundamental rights in the context of new technologies and 
business practices that underlie the dynamics of production and trade in goods 
and services. The implication of thinking of trade agreements in relation to their 
potential for fundamental rights would not necessarily imply an expansion of the 
range of fundamental rights to be dealt with in a trade agreement – which would 
additionally ‘load the boat.’ Rather, it is necessary to engage in a systematic 
research and open discussion about how to ensure that more complex and 
far-reaching trade agreements do not provide additional fuel to downward pres-
sures on fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, when new features and 
mechanisms are envisaged (eg. further liberalisation, inclusion of non-state 
actors, regulatory cooperation, institution-building), the fundamental rights com-
ponent to them should be appreciated, potential harming effects be taken into 
consideration, and mechanisms provided to counter them. If not for the sake of 
social justice,150 protecting fundamental rights ‘in’ trade agreements becomes 
vital for their legitimacy and social acceptance, not least their ultimate success.
150 G. Shaffer, supra note 121.
